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There has long been a concern that hospital system growth through mergers and acquisitions has resulted in higher reimbursement rates. Economists and antitrust authorities have traditionally approached hospital systems as classical horizontal mergers, analyzing the relationship between hospital market concentration and prices. More recently with the rise of managed care, however, the literature has shifted its focus toward the bargaining game between hospitals and managed care organizations (MCOs). Since MCOs are the primary purchasers of hospital services, a hospital's market power is largely determined by how much the MCO's enrollees value the inclusion of the hospital in their network. Hospitals that have fewer local competitors or that provide a unique set of services generate a larger value (i.e., incremental surplus) to the MCO because the services of alternative hospitals are not viewed as a close substitute. 1 Consequently, if two local hospitals merge to form a system and negotiate as one with MCOs, the incremental value of including the two-hospital system in the network is now larger because the MCO can no longer use one hospital as a substitute for the other. The effect is similar to the familiar outward shift in residual demand enjoyed by differentiated product oligopolists who merge and no longer have to compete with each other. If the merging hospitals' costs of treating patients do not change then the increase in willingness to pay raises the total incremental surplus of a contract with these two hospitals. Moreover, if the surplus generated by the contract is divided between the MCO and the hospitals in the same proportions that occurred prior to the merger, then the hospitals' reimbursement rates will increase proportionally with the incremental surplus.
We will refer to this resulting price increase as the market power effect of system formation. Much of the recent empirical work on hospital competition focuses on identifying this local market power effect. 2 Our study investigates a second, important channel through which system formation may impact reimbursement rates: by altering the relative bargaining power of hospitals vis-á-vis MCOs.
Local market power arises because a system's incremental value to the MCO network is larger than the sum of each individual member's incremental value increasing the surplus to be split between the system members and MCO. Additionally, system hospitals may be able to extract a larger share of this surplus from MCOs by leveraging the system in some way to negotiate more favorable rates.
We refer to this as the bargaining power effect.
Research has shown that uncertainties in the value of a contract to the other party can weaken the uncertain party's bargaining position (Fudenberg and Tirole, 1983; Sobel and Takahashi, 1983) .
Thus, system hospitals may be able to improve their bargaining position by pooling information on MCOs and sharing the costs of creating a larger and more skilled team of contract negotiators.
For example, in 2004 Tenet Healthcare-a national system of 73 hospitals-adopted a "national negotiating template and new technology to analyze payer-specific profit and loss data, giving negotiators ammunition during contract talks" (Colias, 2006) . 3 Individual hospitals may not have the size or resources to pursue such strategies.
1 It is important to note that consumers' value of (or willingness to pay for) having access to a hospital is not the underlying value of the services they will receive, but the value of receiving these services from this hospital rather than the next best alternative. In this sense, the relevant willingness to pay for access to a hospital is akin to the residual demand curve of a typical oligopolist.
2 For example, see Town and Vistnes (2001) and Capps, Dranove and Satterthwaite (2003) . 3 According to Tenet's CEO this initiative was necessary because Tenet was "being outgunned by the managed care companies in negotiations" (Colias, 2006) . Alternatively, seminal works by Binmore, Rubinstein and Wolinsky (1986) and Rubinstein, Safra and Thomson (1992) show that in a bilateral bargaining game the more risk averse player receives a lower share of the net surplus (i.e., higher relative risk aversion lowers bargaining power).
Negotiations with system hospitals can pose greater risk to MCOs if a breakdown in bargaining leads all of the system's hospitals to withdraw from the MCO's network. When MCO executives or their contract negotiators are risk averse (or are more risk averse than hospital system executives), they may be at a greater disadvantage in negotiations with system hospitals than with non-system hospitals. In these cases, mergers of hospitals can result in significant changes to bargaining power even when systems form across geographic markets and have no impact on local market concentration. Such bargaining power effects have been overlooked by existing analyses that focus only on local market concentration.
Our empirical strategy models bargaining power as a function of hospital and system characteristics allowing us to separately identify the hospitals' markups that arise because of market power and the markups that arise because of bargaining power. We begin by estimating a structural model of demand based on the observed characteristics of patients, their illnesses, and of hospitals.
The incremental value of adding a hospital to an MCO's network is derived from the estimated utility of all patients who would choose the hospital after having become ill (Capps et al., 2003) .
Additionally, the demand estimates are used to both predict the number of additional managed care patients that will visit a hospital if it is added to an MCO's network as well as to predict where patients would alternatively go if a given hospital is not in their choice set.
Next, using data on hospitals' operating costs, in-patient days, out-patient visits, and other characteristics we estimate a hospital cost function. The cost function is used to calculate the change in cost that a hospital would incur if it were added to an MCO's network: reflecting the additional costs of treating the MCO's patients that are predicted to visit the hospital. The surplus created by adding a hospital to an MCO's network is calculated using the incremental value of adding a hospital to an MCO's network net the hospital's expected cost of treating the patients enrolled with the MCO as well as the change in the MCO's reimbursement expenditures.
Finally, we incorporate data on hospital revenues into an asymmetric Nash bargaining model to estimate how the surplus generated by the contract is split between hospitals and MCOs. Hospital bargaining power is specified as a function of various hospital, system, and market characteristics to identify the factors associated with differences in bargaining power.
Our results indicate that hospitals with certain characteristics tend to have significantly higher bargaining power. For example, hospitals affiliated with physicians groups have higher bargaining power, and in addition to the market power that results from being particularly valuable to patients, teaching hospitals also secure a much larger share of the contract surplus that they generate. On the other hand, we find no evidence that the bargaining power of a hospital or system varies with its size or market share in a local market indicating that price differences associated with these characteristics originates from the market power effect alone. With respect to system characteristics we uncover strong evidence that the bargaining power of a system hospital is associated with the number of system hospitals located outside of that local market. On average this bargaining power difference translates into system hospitals extracting an additional 5% of the surplus they generate with the larger national systems extracting substantially more. As Dranove and White (1998) first point out, this latter finding underscores a need to move beyond the traditional definition for a hospital's market in assessing system formation and growth.
Examining the relative impact of system membership on a hospital's markups, our results reveal that on average the bargaining power effect makes a substantially larger contribution to a system hospital's markup than the contribution stemming from market power. For example, the average additional markup in the per diem reimbursement created by the bargaining power effect is $416 in contrast to the additional $73 that is created by the market power effect derived from system membership. This finding underscores the importance of accounting for the differences in bargaining power between hospitals and suggests that focusing on market power alone may lead to misleading predictions when evaluating the potential affect of system acquisitions and growth.
In addition to advancing current understanding of hospital competition and the role of hospital systems, we feel that our study also provides a valuable contribution to the literature on competition in negotiated price markets more generally. While many important products (such as automobiles, real estate, services, and intermediate goods) are traded at negotiated prices, there is relatively little empirical work explicitly studying competition in negotiated price markets. Often existing research on these products (e.g., automobiles) effectively models them as having posted prices for simplicity. However, while relationships between competition and posted prices are generally well understood, this relationship is much less straightforward in negotiated price markets.
Factors such as product differentiation or a lack of competition that tend to generate market power in posted price markets often have an analogous effect in negotiated price markets in that they lead consumers to have a higher willingness to pay to complete a transaction with a particular seller. However, the impact of these factors on the final price is dependent upon how that price is negotiated, since actual transaction prices in these markets can lie anywhere between the buyer's willingness to pay and the seller's opportunity cost. If factors that typically influence market power could also affect the relative bargaining power of the buyers and sellers, then the bargaining process must be incorporated into the analysis in order to obtain an accurate model of observed pricing behavior. Our study highlights the importance of this approach in studying the impact of hospital concentration on negotiated reimbursement rates.
The paper develops as follows. We begin by providing some background on the evolution of the hospital-MCO relationship in Section I. Section II provides a summary of the related literature, highlighting the differences in the current study and previous studies. Section III develops the estimation strategy. Section IV describes the data. Results to the demand, cost, and bargaining estimations are presented in Section V. In Section VI we estimate the additional markups that are attributable to the market and bargaining power effects. Lastly, Section VII ends with some concluding remarks.
I. Background

A. Market Structure
The relationship between hospitals and insurers has undergone significant change with the advent of managed care. Before MCOs-such as health maintenance organizations (HMOs)-came to prominence hospitals were paid on a fee-for-service basis yielding substantial power to hospitals to set their own prices. As HMO penetration rates increased through the 1990s hospitals were forced to become more competitive with their prices in order to secure HMO membership or risk substantial reductions in patient volume. With this paradigm change, the nature of hospital pricing and competition moved away from being patient-driven to being payer-driven (Dranove et al., 1993) .
Today consumers have come to prefer Preferred Provider Organizations (PPOs)-a less restrictive form of managed care-over HMOs to the extent that they are now the predominant form of not just managed care, but of health insurance in general. Illustrating their recent sensational growth, PPO market share for employer provided insurance has increased from 39% in 1999 to 60%, while HMO market share has declined from 28% to 20%. 4 In addition to the switch away from indemnity insurance to managed care, many insurance markets have also become much more found that 64% of the MSAs had one insurer with a market share of 50% or greater.
The hospital market has also experienced considerable change over the last couple of decades as hospital systems-groups of hospitals that are either jointly owned or contract managed by a third-party-have come into prominence. For example, there were an average of 73 hospital mergers and acquisitions each year from 1998 to 2008. 5 Today over 57% of all acute-care hospitals in the U.S. are in a system. 6
B. Contract Negotiations
Whether hospitals and MCOs are negotiating a contract for the first time or renegotiating a contract the negotiation process can be very complicated. Hospitals and MCOs must determine quality targets, historical payer behavior with respect to claims denial and underpayments, as well as the expected case-mix across clinical areas and treatment settings (Boyd and Finman, 2010; Osten, 2011) . Furthermore payments often take many different forms such as capitation, per diems, and fee-for-services reflecting the relative risks and preferences for taking on those risks. Contracts may specify distinct payment rates for thousands of different Current Procedural Terminology (CPT) codes and can be hundreds of pages in length. The complexities of the contract require negotiators to have a substantial amount of information and skill in order to achieve a favorable outcome. In fact, Kongstvedt (2001) claims that the skills of the negotiator are the most important component for securing a favorable outcome in the negotiating process.
Given the complexities of the contract and the importance of the negotiators' skills, it would not be surprising to find significant differences in relative bargaining power across hospitals. 7 The hospital administration and managed care trade literatures highlight a number of specific factors that can influence a hospital's bargaining power over an MCO. For example, many articles stress the importance of information in the negotiation process (Benko, 2003; Osten, 2011) . 8 Larger hospital systems who more regularly negotiate contracts may have a distinct advantage in ability to collect information on the state of the market and may have the resources and experience to better utilize the information to formulate more sophisticated negotiating strategies. It has also been suggested in the literature that the ability of a hospital to credibly threaten to walk away from a negotiation can leave it in a stronger bargaining position (Rollins, 2000; Lowes, 2008) . This latter characteristic suggests that relative levels of risk aversion may play a role in the bargaining power of hospitals over an MCO when an increase in the probability of a breakdown in negotiations results in larger Cuellar and Gertler (2003) for a more detailed look at the growth and breakdown of system membership. 7 Grennan (2010) identifies similar differences in hospitals' bargaining power in the negotiations with suppliers for the purchase of coronary stints.
8 Benko (2003) provides a quote from one hospital advisor saying: "Negotiating is all about knowledge. The better informed you are, the more leverage you have." 6 payments to the hospital.
II. Related Literature
There exists an extensive literature studying the determinants of hospital pricing. The traditional strand of literature consists of classical price-concentration analyses. Examples include Dranove, Shanley and White (1993) , Lynk (1995) , Melnick, Zwanziger, Bamezai and Pattison (1992) , Connor, Feldman and Dowd (1998) , Simpson and Shin (1998) , Keeler, Melnick and Zwanziger (1999) , Cuellar and Gertler (2005) , and Melnick and Keeler (2007) . These analyses typically involve regressing some measure of a hospital's price against a measure of market concentrationgenerally a Herfindahl-Hirschmann index (HHI)and hospital characteristics. A shortcoming of these reduced form studies is the inherent difficulty in disentangling a price differential from unobservable differences in quality and/or costs from that of market power. If a hospital's market share is based on a higher service quality, then its price differential may be incorrectly attributed to market power.
Though not based on a bargaining model, Melnick and Keeler (2007) foreshadow some of the results of this paper by observing that hospitals belonging to systems have higher prices than nonsystem hospitals even after controlling for the increased market concentration created by systems.
Moreover, the authors find that hospitals belonging to systems operating in multiple patient markets also have higher prices. Brooks, Dor and Wong (1997) are the first to apply a structural bargaining model to the hospital pricing problem. Brooks et al. (1997) utilize an asymmetric Nash bargaining model and focus on the negotiated prices for an appendectomy. The authors define the surplus generated from a contract between an MCO and hospital as the difference in the hospital's list prices and the Medicare reimbursement rate. This can be problematic, though, if list prices have little correlation with the value of the hospital to patients and the MCO. Moreover, the bargaining model utilized assumes that there is only one hospital and one insurer in the market generating a different surplus calculation than if there are multiple hospitals. 9
Instead of using the hospital's list-price, Capps et al. (2003) build off of Town and Vistnes (2001) by utilizing a similar option-value framework to estimate enrollees' willingness to pay (WTP) to have access to a hospital. 10 Capps et al. then use the WTP measure to estimate the market power effect of a hospital merger. Although we utilize the option-demand framework developed by Capps 9 As a consequence to there being only one hospital, if the hospital and MCO fail to negotiate a contract, patients will still visit the hospital and the MCO must pay the hospital's list prices. 10 Town and Vistnes (2001) model the hospital's reimbursement rate as a function of both the incremental value of a hospital to the MCO and the incremental value of the next closest substitute hospital; capturing the effect that strategic HMO network formation has on a hospital's price, but not the differences in bargaining power that may be generated by system formation. et al., there are a few notable methodological differences between the two analyses. Capps et al. assume that the costs for both the MCO and the hospital do not change when the hospital is added to the MCO's network. 11 Additionally, they assume that hospitals share a common, immutable bargaining power. In contrast we utilize our demand estimates to simulate where patients will go when a hospital is removed from the network, and then estimate how both the hospital's costs and the MCO's costs will change as a result of these changes in patient flows. By including these in the calculation for the contract surplus we can allow for and identify differences in bargaining power in addition to differences in market power between hospitals.
Our model also shares certain features with that of Grennan (2010) who utilizes a Nash bargaining framework to analyze the welfare effects of price discrimination by medical device manufacturers in the market for coronary stents. Grennan also separately identifies the market power and bargaining power of hospitals with respect to the medical device makers. Moreover, Grennan allows bargaining power to vary by hospital reflecting idiosyncratic differences in the hospitals' negotiating skills. However, as the focus of the paper is on the welfare effects of price discrimination, Grennan does not identify hospital or system characteristics that may be associated with bargaining power whereas we allow bargaining power to vary based on observable characteristics of the hospital and its patient market allowing us to separately estimate the additional markups that are attributable to market or bargaining power.
Other structural models of hospital pricing include Gaynor and Vogt (2003) who model hospital markets as a differentiated product oligopoly and Ho (2009) who uses data on MCO networks and premiums to model the hospital competition and pricing. Ho finds that system hospitals, capacity constrained hospitals, and star hospitals attain higher mark-ups over cost. 12 However, this approach cannot be used to identify the channels through which a hospital system secures higher reimbursements; i.e., markup differences that arise because of differences in threat points versus those that arise because of differences in bargaining abilities. 13 11 Both assumptions essentially follow the bargaining model of Brooks et al. (1997) and are based off of the assumption that enrollees still visit the hospital when the hospital and MCO fail to negotiate a contract.
12 Star hospitals are defined as those hospitals which have market shares above the ninetieth percentile when MCOs contract with all hospitals in the market. 13 Ho's analysis also relies on estimating both hospital costs and reimbursement rates using only data on MCO plan prices and network information, whereas our analysis uses data on observed reimbursement rates and measures of observed hospital costs.
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III. Model for Estimation
A. Willingness to Pay
We utilize the framework developed by Capps et al. (2003) to estimate the market willingness to pay for having access to a hospital. 14 We start by modeling the utility for patients receiving treatment at a hospital. The ex post utility of patient i who, after developing an illness, obtains treatment from hospital h is defined as
where H h = [R h , S h ] is a column vector of hospital h's characteristics which are common across all illnesses, R h , and those characteristics which are illness specific, S h . Hospital characteristics, which may affect the quality of its services, include properties such as teaching status, for-profit status, system and network membership and ownership by a physician group. The quality of care delivered by a hospital may also be affected by any physician arrangements used as part of an integrated healthcare delivery program, especially when those arrangements are selective about which physicians may become members; therefore we include indicators for four common physician arrangements. 16 A hospital's services include items such as high-technology imaging equipment and items specific to diagnostic categories such as a birthing room or the ability to perform heart surgery.
Given the ex post utility of patient i, as established in the literature on choice models, patient i's interim utility of having hospital h in his choice set M = {1, 2, . . . , M } is denoted as
From (1) it is clear that hospital h's contribution to patient i's interim utility derived from MCO m's network M is 17
where s h (M | H h , X i , λ i ) is hospital h's market share when included in network M given by the logit demand specification:
There is no outside option because the data contain only those patients which have become sufficiently ill that they choose to visit a hospital. Integrating (2) over the population distribution of patient attributes, diseases, and patient locations produces the ex ante value of including hospital h in the network M . Let F (X i , λ i ) denote the joint cumulative distribution of patient characteristics, diseases, and locations of all patients who will visit a hospital, then the total ex ante willingness to
where N m is the number of enrollees with MCO m sufficiently ill that they visit a hospital in the choice set and γ p is the (assumed) constant conversion factor for converting dollars into utils. 18
B. Hospital Cost
Following earlier literature on estimating the cost function of multi-product firms (See Fournier and Mitchell (1997) , Bamezai and Melnick (2006) , and Capps, Dranove and Lindrooth (2010) for examples of applying the trans-log specification to hospital cost estimation) we use a form of the 17 Note that we do not observe the patients' out-of-pocket costs so similar to Capps et al. (2003) and Ho (2009) we must assume they are the same for a patient across hospitals.
18 Capps et al. (2003) provide a detailed discussion of how the estimates may be biased when γp is not constant.
trans-log specification where hospital h's cost at time t is estimated as A hospital's staffed beds multiplied by the nurse-to-bed ratio are used as a single input and captures the size of the hospital, the efficiency of the hospital staffing, and, to some degree, the average case-severity mix for the hospital. We control for wage differences between hospitals by including fixed effects for the hospital's health service area (HSA) as defined by the Centers for Disease Control. In order to measure short-run costs we do not include hospital fixed-effects (Baltagi and Griffin, 1984) . However, to minimize omitted variable bias we include other hospital characteristics such as the hospital's type of control (for-profit, non-profit), rural status, teaching status, if the hospital is operated by a physicians' group, the ratio of Medicare to other payer discharges, the presence of a positron emission tomography machine, and the presence of a magnetic resonance imaging (MRI) machine.
C. Bargaining
There are several bargaining games that could arguably be employed to model MCO-hospital contract negotiations including more complex models like Stole and Zweibel (1996) contracts. This establishes a contract equilibriumá la Cremer and Riordan (1987) in which no party wants to renegotiate in equilibrium. More specifically, our contract equilibrium relies on the following assumptions:
A1. All hospitals (or hospital systems) negotiate their contracts simultaneously with MCOs.
A2. The parties negotiate each contract under the assumption that in equilibrium all other MCOs and hospitals/systems will successfully negotiate contracts with the other hospitals/systems and MCOs operating in the patient market.
A3. The bargaining outcome between hospital h and MCO m does not influence the bargaining outcome between hospital h and any other MCO m , or any other hospital h and MCO m. 21, 22 While contracts between MCOs and non-system hospitals are negotiated individually, in practice hospital systems negotiate a shared contract with the MCO that covers all the system's hospitals within a particular patient market or metropolitan area. If negotiations breakdown, then the enrollees of the MCO are essentially excluded from obtaining services at any of the system's hospitals 20 Capps et al. (2003) develop a simple theoretical model of network formation to show that the profit-maximizing strategy for an MCO is to add every hospital to its network, 21 In equilibrium each party knows what the negotiated reimbursement rates will be, thus we are assuming that the hospitals and MCOs do not know when an off-equilibrium path rate is negotiated between any MCO-hospital pairs. In addition to simplifying the analysis, the reimbursement rates established between an MCO and hospital are private information. MCOs and hospitals can observe which other MCOs and hospitals have successfully negotiated contracts and this information may play a strategic role in the bargaining game; however, since we do not observe which MCOs are present in a particular market and further, which MCOs and hospitals have contracts, by necessity we assume that this information does not affect the bargaining strategy between any MCO/hospital pair.
22 This assumption is clearly violated when a contract also requires that the hospital does not give larger discounts to other MCOs as in the case of Michigan Blue Cross, which has been sued by the U.S. Justice Department for antitrust violations (http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSN1827666920101018). until a deal is reached. To capture this, the unit contracting with the MCO in our model will be either an individual non-system hospital or the set of hospitals associated with a particular system in a particular metropolitan area or patient market. 23 In other words, we assume that a set of local system hospitals effectively acts as one hospital with multiple geographic locations, maximizing the joint profit of the system hospitals. 24 To simplify the exposition of the model we will simply use the term hospital to refer to the unit negotiating with the MCO, be it a single non-system hospital or a group of system hospitals within the same patient market.
Under assumptions A1-A3, every contract negotiation between a hospital (i.e., a single nonsystem hospital or a hospital system) and an MCO can be thought of as an independent bilateral bargaining game. We are interested in allowing hospitals and systems with different characteristics to have different degrees of bargaining power. To facilitate this we adopt an approach similar to Brooks et al. (1997) and Grennan (2010) and employ a version of the cooperative bargaining model developed by Nash (1950 Nash ( , 1953 which includes an asymmetric bargaining power parameter. 25, 26 The outcome of the bilateral bargaining game depends heavily on the party's disagreement points. In practice, these payoffs depend on how an MCO's enrollees will change their hospital choice if a hospital is removed from their MCO network. We make the assumption that if a hospital does not contract with a particular MCO, then the hospital will no longer treat patients from that MCO, and the MCO's enrollees that would visit that hospital upon falling ill will instead visit a different hospital within the network. 27 In particular, we abstract from the possibility that some consumers will choose to switch MCOs in order to keep the hospital in their choice set. There are several reasons why we think this assumption is appropriate for this setting. First, since a majority of private insurance in the U.S. is provided by employers, individual enrollees are quite limited in their ability to switch MCOs in the short-run. Second, for most acute illnesses enrollees are not likely to have already determined a favored provider and will consult their MCO's current 23 Patient markets are defined according to the U.S. Census Bureau's Metropolitan Statistical Areas (MSAs) with some further delineation by metropolitan divisions within the San Francisco Bay and Los Angeles MSAs. While these market definitions are only used to determine the contracting unit for hospital systems they can also be considered distinct markets from a demand perspective. Based on our demand estimates, the aggregate willingness to pay for system hospitals in a particular patient market increases by less than 0.001% when any system affiliate outside the market is removed from patients choice sets. In other words, system hospitals in adjacent patient markets provide virtually no additional market power.
24 In some cases larger hospital systems may negotiate a contract with a particular MCO that covers hospitals in multiple metropolitan areas; however, patients in one market will not view hospitals in another market as substitutes so the surplus generated by the contract will be equivalent to the sum of the surpluses for each patient market. In consequence, treating the larger system as a single unit of observation will not capture any unmeasured market power.
25 Svejnar (1986) is the first to utilize the asymmetric Nash bargaining model in estimating the relative bargaining power of labor unions.
26 Binmore et al. (1986) model the bilateral bargaining process as a strategic game of counter offers and show that at the limit the strategic game results in the same division of the surplus as Nash's cooperative bargaining game.
27 Brooks et al. (1997) incorporate the Nash bargaining game as the hospital pricing mechanism and implicitly assume that there is only one hospital and one MCO in the market so that patients must be tied to the MCO. In consequence, if the two fail to reach an agreement, then instead of seeking treatment at a different in-network hospital, patients will continue to visit the hospital and the insurer will have to pay list prices. Capps et al. (2003) utilize the bargaining outcome of Brooks et al. (1997) thus make the same assumption.
13
network provider list when they fall ill. Existing empirical evidence also suggests that few enrollees switch MCOs in response to a change in the provider network. For example Ho (2006) uses data on managed care plans and networks to estimate the demand for managed care coverage as a function of observables including the estimated utility of the associated hospital network. Applying her elasticity estimates to California suggest on average the MCO will lose less than 1% of its enrollees to other MCOs when a system is removed from an MCO's network. 28 Moreover, we find that the most predictive system characteristics for bargaining power are characteristics belonging to systems having hospitals in multiple patient markets, thus, are not affected by factors associated with local market power.
Following the institutional motivation above, we make the following assumptions regarding the nature of the bilateral bargaining game:
A4. Systems negotiate a shared contract on behalf of all member hospitals within a single patient market.
A5. If an MCO does not reach a contract with a particular hospital, its enrollees no longer visit that hospital and instead choose from the remaining hospitals in the MCO's network.
Applying assumptions A4 and A5, the disagreement point for hospital (or system) h negotiating with MCO m is the profit that h receives when it is not in MCO m's network M, which we denote as Π h (H \ m). Similarly the disagreement point for MCO m is the profit m receives when h is not in its network, denoted as Π m (M \ h). The profits received by the hospital and MCO when they successfully negotiate a contract are denoted as Π h (H) and Π m (M), respectively. The objective function for MCO m and hospital h can thus be expressed as (5) max
where α h is hospital h's bargaining power vis-á-vis MCO m and p hm is the reimbursement price agreed to by MCO m and hospital h. Π m (M) is MCO m's profit from network M and the vector of reimbursement prices
Ho (2006) reports a price elasticity of demand of -1.24. She also reports that a one standard deviation increase in the expected utility is equivalent to a $39 decrease in the premium indicating that a one standard deviation drop in the expected utility of a hospital network results in a loss of 31% of the enrollees. In California a one standard deviation in the distribution of expected utility from the observed choice-sets is 2.451 utils and the average change in the expected utility from removing a hospital and an entire system from a choice set is 0.034 (0.212) and 0.079 (0.316) utils, respectively. The low impact of removing a single hospital or system occurs because most variation in the expected utility is across markets. Assuming a similar demand elasticity for insurance in California, these data suggest that the removal of one hospital or one system will, on average, lower an MCO's demand by 0.4% and 0.9%, respectively. with reimbursement price vector P H = {p h1 , p h2 , . . . , p hm , . . . , p hH } and the set of networks H, and
Under assumptions A4 and A5, when a hospital can threaten its removal from network M the difference in the profits for MCO m and hospital h are expressed as
where D h (M) is the expected demand for hospital h from enrollees in MCO m's network M; By plugging the profits into (5) and taking the first-order condition, the bargaining outcome can be expressed as
The term in brackets on the RHS represents the total amount of surplus generated by h and m successfully negotiating a contract. In this way, the observed profit for a given hospital is a function of the value the hospital brings to an MCO's network, the hospital's treatment costs, the reimbursement rates for alternative hospitals, and the hospital's bargaining power α h . To simplify 29 Formally:
the notation somewhat, let
In words, ∆ h R m (M \ h) identifies the change in MCO m's reimbursements to all other hospitals when hospital h is removed from m's network M. Using ∆ h R m (M \ h), (7) can be expressed as:
To further identify how hospital, system, and market characteristics affect the bargaining power of hospital h the bargaining power, α h , is parameterized as
where H h is either the individual hospital's characteristics or the aggregate characteristics of the individual system hospitals within a single patient market that affect bargaining power (e.g., ownership type, physician arrangements, teaching status, system membership), S h are system characteristics that affect bargaining power (e.g., the number of member hospitals, the number of markets in which the system operates, whether the system contains a teaching hospital), M h are market characteristics for h's market that affect bargaining power (e.g., the concentration of MCOs), and ε h is a mean zero, independently distributed, heteroskedastic random variable that captures unobserved heterogeneity between hospitals that affect a hospital's relative bargaining power.
We have two issues that prevent us from directly estimating (8). First, our patient choice data does not include out-of-pocket costs preventing us from estimating the value for γ p in the demand specification and using that estimate to calculate the value of adding a hospital to an MCO in dollars 
where t indexes time; ∆ m Π h,t (p hm ) is the average change in profit from contracting with an MCO m; ∆ h V m,t (M) is the average change in ex ante value (in utils) for adding hospital h to MCO m's
is hospital h's average change in cost for treating enrollees from MCO m; ∆ h R m,t (M \ h) is the average change in reimbursements by MCO m to all hospitals other than h that results from removing hospital h from the network M, all at time t. 30,31 The average profit, value, and cost changes represent the average changes (across MCOs) that would occur if one MCO withdrew all its patients from the hospital in a given year. For example, if five MCOs have an equal share of the market, then the average consists of the change in profit, value, and cost using 20% of the total number of managed care patients predicted to visit hospital h. The dollar value of a util is free to change across years, reflecting any possible changes in tastes. 32 We estimate (10) using the method of maximum likelihood. The parameters within the bargaining power term (i.e., the term in parenthesis) are identified off of variation across hospitals in the amount of profits earned relative to the size of the surplus generated by the hospital. The utils-to-dollars conversion factor γ −1 p is identified separately from the other parameters because the surplus generated by a hospital depends not only on the utility the hospital provides to patients but also on the hospital's costs of treating those patients.
IV. Data
We use data from several sources for estimation. Hospital characteristics come from the Amer- The error term ε h,t is assumed to be independently distributed across hospitals but may be correlated across time for each hospital.
31 Eq (10) can also be expressed as:
where υ h,t is a multiplicatively heteroskedastic error term that is independently distributed across hospitals. 32 It should be noted that in Eq. (10) it is not entirely accurate to refer to γ −1 p,t as the conversion factor for utils-to-dollars because the parameter also absorbs the percentage that premiums are marked-down from consumers' willingness to pay, which is a function of the competitiveness in the insurance market. We find that γ −1 p,t is different between rural and urban markets, though controlling for this difference has no impact on the point estimates for the bargaining power parameters. We find no statistically significant difference in γ −1 p,t between regions such as Southern California compared to Middle and Northern California. Note: There is no statistical difference between the probability of being a for-profit hospital conditional on being a private hospital in a system (p < .10).
AHA and OSHPD data sets. 33 The hospital characteristics include properties of the hospital such as its ownership type (government, profit, and non-profit), teaching status, and system and network membership, as well as dummy variables for the services the hospital offers. we first calculate the deduction ratio by payer by dividing the total net revenues by the total gross charges for each payer. Then, to account for revenue differences for patients admitted through the emergency room versus those with scheduled appointments we multiply the deduction ratio by the total charges for payer and admittance type divided by the total number of in-patient days by payer and admittance type. 35 Our focus is on Medicare and privately insured patients only so we 33 For excluded hospitals, neither the hospitals' name or address represented a match. In some instances a hospital's name and address differ between the two data sources; however, the addresses are for the same campus, thus identify the same hospital.
34 Specifically, we use the average revenue per in-patient day to estimate a hospital's profit from treating managed care patients as well as to calculate an MCO's alternative reimbursements to other hospitals if a hospital is removed from its network causing those enrollees that would visit that hospital to choose an alternative hospital in the network (∆ h Rm(M \ h)). 35 For example, the revenue per day for a patient in a managed care, Medicare (MC-M) plan who was admitted through the Medi-Cal patients may have a restricted choice-set and worker's compensation and self-pay patients may also have preferences differing significantly from the privately insured population.
37 18,679 or slightly less than 2 percent of the discharges in the sample are from admissions scheduled in advance for hospitals over 90 minutes away.
38 From the OSHPD documentation: Comparable includes hospitals whose data and operating characteristics are comparable with other hospitals 39 Excluding Kaiser hospitals does not affect the analysis because Kaiser is an HMO providing both the insurance and hospital services and we are examining the bargaining power of hospitals conditional on patients enrolling with a non-Kaiser insurer.
Diagnostic Category (MDC). Of the 25 MDCs, we eliminated all MDCs accounting for less than one half of a percent of the total discharges, MDCs for which there may be significant non-hospital competition (e.g., mental diseases and disorders), as well as the discharges related to neonatal care leaving 15 MDCs. 40 The final sample used to estimate the demand system contains 2,027,323 discharges. 41 Nearly 64% of the discharges are for privately insured patients with the remaining 36% representing Medicare patients. Patients having managed care plans account for about 62% of the discharges. The average choice set contains 39 hospitals. The average travel time to a chosen hospital is 21 minutes and the average travel time to a hospital in one's choice set is 36 minutes. 42
V. Results
A. Demand
The demand specification contains an array of patient level and hospital level characteristics. Patient (or discharge) level variables include gender, age category, race, zip code median income, travel time to the hospital, length of stay, and indicators for the MDC associated with the discharge.
Hospital level characteristics include service related variables, and variables related to ownership, for-profit status, system status, and relationships with physicians' groups. We interact some MDCs with many of the relevant services of the hospital. For example we interact a diagnosis of child birth with a dummy indicating if the hospital has a birthing room. 43 We allow the effects of system-status and for-profit status to vary across the different MDCs. Since travel time is the most important determinant of hospital choice we interact all hospital and individual characteristics with travel time. This allows consumers to differ in their willingness to travel for different hospital attributes.
The estimation is performed using only patients enrolled in traditional insurance and Medicare who have completely unconstrained choice sets. 44 Table 3 reports the year 2008 coefficient estimates for many of the hospital characteristics. For each hospital characteristic, the first column reports the base coefficient estimate while the second column reports the coefficient for the hospital characteristic interacted with the patient's travel 40 The six MDCs eliminated include: eye diseases and disorders, mental diseases and disorders, poisonings and toxic effects of drugs, burns, multiple significant trauma, and human immunodeficiency virus infections.
41 Summary statistics can be found in Table A2 in the Online Appendix 42 Travel time is calculated using the Google Maps API and is calculated as the travel time from the patient's home zip code centroid to the hospital taking into account traffic patterns, speed limits, and stop lights. For a couple rural zip codes there is no travel route from the zip code centroid because it is a desert or national or state park. In these cases the center of the nearest small town within the zip code is used and in all cases there is only one such town.
43 Appendix Table A1 reports the eighteen such services and the MDC with which they are interacted. 44 Similar to Capps et al. (2003) , Ho (2006) , and Ho (2009) we assume that the preferences over hospitals do not differ between those enrolled in traditional indemnity insurance and those enrolled in managed care plans. Note: Estimates are from the 2008 discharge data. All hospital characteristics are indicator variables except the nurse-to-bed ratio which has a mean of 1.4. The column "Interaction w/ travel time" reports the coefficient estimate for the hospital characteristic interacted with patient travel time. Marginal effects and util differences are evaluated at the mean travel time (36.3 min.) and for the marginal effects at the mean choice probability (.022) for all hospitals in a patient's choice set. Both marginal effects and util differences account for both the intercept and interaction terms. The util difference represents the difference in utils of a hospital with the characteristic compared to an identical hospital without the characteristic.
time in minutes to the hospital. The final two columns of Table 3 help to illustrate the impact that each characteristic has on hospital choice. Column 3 reports the marginal effect of each hospital characteristic on the probability of choosing a hospital, evaluated at the average choice probability and the average travel time to a hospital in a choice set. Column 4 reports the average change in a patient's utility or value (in utils) for a hospital derived from that characteristic, again evaluated at the average travel time to a hospital. 45 The marginal effect estimates indicate that a number of hospital characteristics have important effects on hospital choice probability. For example, teaching hospitals are 50% more likely to be chosen (an increase in the choice probability of p = 0.022 to p = 0.033) than an otherwise comparable non-teaching hospital, while government hospitals are about 50% less likely to be chosen. Many of the service offerings have an even larger effect on the choice probabilities.
As discussed in Section IV, some services that are generally targeted to illnesses classified under a specific MDC only enter the utility function for discharges that fall within that MDC. These types of service variables help to predict that patients within that MDC will be much more likely to visit hospitals offering related services. For example, patients visiting a hospital for child birth are three times more likely to choose a hospital that offers general obstetrics care. Other hospital services are utilized in the treatment of illnesses from a wide range of MDCs. These service variables help to identify hospitals that provide a more advanced level of care in general and allow for the fact that patients may be more likely to visit these hospitals. Chemotherapy is an example of this type of service as it is used to treat cancers affecting a wide variety of different systems of the body. The marginal effects imply that hospitals offering chemotherapy are more than three times as likely to be chosen by a patient over a similar hospital which does not offer chemotherapy. Patients also derive a higher utility for higher nurse-to-bed ratio hospitals.
Coefficients on the interactions of travel time with specific hospital services are often positive indicating that patients are willing to travel further to get specialized or advanced care such as cardiac surgery or chemotherapy. 46 However, some travel time interactions have negative coefficients suggesting that patients derive considerable value from the characteristics but are not willing to travel far to visit a hospital with that characteristic or service. For example the highest total change in utility comes from obstetrics care, but the coefficient on the interaction of travel time with obstetrics care is negative indicating a higher disutility of traveling when a patient is visiting a hospital for child birth. Similarly the coefficient on emergency care and travel time is also negative.
45 In theory we could use the estimate for γp to express the difference in dollars; however, because γp is absorbing the difference between the premium and the willingness to pay as well, it is an underestimate of the utils-to-dollar conversion.
46 Note that the total effect of travel time is still negative. A positive coefficient on the interaction of travel time with a service indicates that the decrease in utility is less when traveling to access that service.
Since our focus is on better understanding why reimbursement rates differ between system and non-system hospitals, we want to account for any differences in patients' willingness to pay to have access to system hospitals that is not captured by other observable hospital characteristics. As a result, we include variables indicating whether a hospital is in a system, whether that system is for-profit, and whether that system is local or national in scope. These system membership variables are interacted with MDC indicators to allow for any systematic differences in the value of system membership across diagnostic categories. Table 4 provides estimates of the difference in value in utils associated with the hospital being in a system for the average patient in that MDC, ceteris paribus. 47 For example, the first row of Table 4 identifies the difference in value for a patient diagnosed with an illness of the nervous system (MDC 1). The mean distance from the chosen hospital for such a patient is 36 minutes. The first column identifies the difference in value for a not-for-profit hospital from not being in a system to being in a local system that does not cross state lines, and it is negative (−.1498). Similarly the second column identifies the difference in value for a not-for-profit hospital from not being in a system to being in a system that crosses state lines, 48 and it is positive (.0177). 49 The only consistently positive difference in value comes from systems that are national in scope, independent of whether the hospital is not-for-profit or for-profit. Interpreting the point estimates is somewhat challenging given the nebulous units that define a util; however, we can gain some perspective by comparing the difference in utils from system membership with the difference in utils from a teaching hospital. For example, for an average patient 36 minutes from the hospital, teaching status adds 0.5311 utils of value over an identical non-teaching hospital in 2008. In comparison, a patient visiting a hospital for child birth (MDC 14) values a for-profit hospital by 1.6066 utils more if that hospital is in a national system compared to if it is not in a system and values a hospital belonging to a national system by 0.6179 utils more than a hospital belonging to a local system. These differences indicate that the value added by system membership can be quite significant and that unobserved quality differences could have a large impact on observed price differences between system and non-system hospitals. 47 We present these effects in utils since this most closely reflects how they will impact patients' willingness to pay for a hospital in the bargaining estimation.
48 For clarity we refer to systems that span state lines as a National system. Many of these systems are truly national in scope, but several are more regional concentrating in the west coast or the south western states. 49 We tried different demand specifications having various categorizations of system status. For example we tried categorizing systems as either single-hospital or multi-hospital systems, however, we found that most of the single-hospital systems in California belonged to national chains so were in fact multi-hospital systems. Reflecting this, there was no real difference between types of system as there is when we bifurcate systems based on their scope. 
B. Cost
We consider a number of different cost function specifications by including indicators for system membership and interactions with hospitals' outputs. The purpose for estimating a hospital's cost function is to use that function to estimate the marginal cost of treating an MCO's enrollees, therefore we picked the specifications which balance a tighter predicted fit against higher precision on the coefficients for the various hospital outputs.
Inpatient days are grouped by payer and include Medicare patients, the privately insured, and a catch-all for all other payers such as Medi-Cal, self-pay, and worker's compensation. The coefficients of interest for the purposes of estimating marginal costs of treating managed care patients are the coefficients associated with discharges from Medicare and privately insured patients. All of the hospital outputs are also interacted with a for-profit dummy to account for any marginal cost differences between the type of hospital. The coefficients on in-patient days for Medicare and privately insured patients are all significant at the 1% level.
Our analysis employs five cost function specifications. Each specification includes fixed effects for time and market area, indicators for profit status, teaching status, rural status, the presence of a PET and/or MRI machine as well as terms for outpatient visits, hospital beds, number of staff, and percentage of patients which are insured by Medicare. Cost model (C1) is the most basic in that it does not include any controls for system membership. Cost models (C2) and (C3) include a dummy for system membership and (C3) additionally includes interactions of teaching status with outputs. Cost model (C4) also includes interaction terms for system membership with outputs to account for any efficiency changes that are either realized through system membership or lead to system membership. Lastly, cost model (C5) includes interactions of both teaching and system membership with the hospital's outputs.
Since our main parameters of interest are in the bargaining power equation, we have relegated further discussion of the cost estimation and a complete set of regression results to an Online Appendix. 50 However, for robustness we will investigate how the use of different cost specifications affect our bargaining power estimates in the next section. Given the rapid decline in market shares and the fact that the top five account for a significant share of the market, we perform our primary analysis with the assumption that 15% of the total number of managed care patients that are predicted to visit a hospital come from a single 50 Table A4 reports the parameter estimates and Tables A6 and A7 report cost differences between for-profit and not-for-profit as well as system and non-system hospitals.
51 The AHA annual survey actually asks hospitals to report the number of HMO and PPO contracts they have, but only 137 accounting for about a third of the private hospitals reported these numbers.
52 Table A3 in the Online Appendix lists the top ten insurers and their market share, showing that the first five insurers account for about 80% of the total market.
representative MCO. For robustness we also estimate the model using several other proportions of predicted managed care patients (ranging from 1% up to 50%) and find fairly similar results.
Estimates from these additional specifications are reported in Table A8 of the Online Appendix.
Because the patients belonging to the MCO represent the hospital's marginal output and costs are not linear in output, the change in a hospital's cost are calculated by subtracting the cost of treating 85 percent of the predicted managed care patients from the cost of treating all of the managed care patients predicted to visit the hospital. 53 The alternative expenditures for an MCO are calculated by taking a 15% sample of the managed care patients predicted to visit a specific hospital and using the demand estimation to simulate where those patients would go if that hospital is removed from their choice set. Because system partner hospitals within the same patient market negotiate as one unit, changes in costs and revenues for these hospitals are aggregated to the system-market level and total changes in willingness to pay and MCOs expenditures are calculated based on removal of all system hospitals within the market. Hospital characteristics used to parametrize bargaining power represent averages across system partners within a patient market with the exception of the number of hospital beds which reflects the total count of beds operated by the system in the local market. As a result of the aggregation across system partners, the final sample size for estimation of the bargaining power model is 197 hospitals (or system-market pairs). Table 5 reports the estimates for one bargaining specification utilizing data generated from the five cost specifications discussed in Section V.B. All standard errors are clustered by hospital and, following Murphy and Topel (1985) , adjusted to account for the data generated from the firststage cost and demand estimations. The coefficient estimates reported in Table 5 describe how hospital/system bargaining power varies with respect to hospital and market characteristics. The parameter estimates vary slightly across specifications but the general relationships are reassuringly stable across cost functions.
Starting with the first row, the base bargaining power is best interpreted as the constant in a standard linear regression model. The overall bargaining power for a hospital is thus found by adding the impact of each of the coefficient estimates for the hospital and market characteristics to this base bargaining power parameter. The second parameter is the coefficient on the market share for Blue Cross/Blue Shield of California (BCBS), the largest MCO operating in the state.
We include BCBS's market share in the bargaining model to control for differences in the relative competitiveness on the MCO side of the market. 54 The market share is measured as the percentage 53 Revenues are calculated by multiplying 15% of the managed care patients predicted to visit a specific hospital by the average length of stay per patient and by the average pre diem revenue for the type of discharge as discussed in Section IV. 54 We do not have accurate data on all MCOs in each market preventing us from using an insurance market concentration index. 197 197 197 197 197 Note: All regressions use 15% of predicted managed care patients for the change in cost calculation. All market shares represent the average market share of patients for the system in a 10 mile radius of each system member within that patient market. Errors are clustered by hospital and adjusted to account for data generated by first-stage regressions. Significance Levels:*** p < .01, ** p< .05, * p < .1 of patients within a 10 mile radius of a hospital who were insured by BCBS. The presumption is that a higher share indicates a more concentrated MCO market. Supporting the notion that concentration on the MCO side of the market lowers the bargaining power of hospitals (Halbersma et al., 2010; Melnick et al., 2011) , the sign is negative, though not statistically significant.
The next pair of parameters represent hospital affiliations with two types of physician organizations: Independent Practice Associations (IPA) and Group Practice Without Walls (GPWW). 55
Previous research, including Cuellar and Gertler (2006) , has found evidence that hospital arrangements with physician groups lead to higher reimbursement rates, with evidence of increased quality in some cases. In addition, Devers et al. (2003) noted that hospitals were becoming increasingly more integrated with physicians groups with the goal of becoming a "crucial gateway" between physicians and MCOs in the local market, highlighting in particular that "greater hospital-physician alignment strengthened hospitals' negotiating leverage and weakened plans' options." We find no evidence in our demand estimates that hospitals affiliated with an IPA or a GPWW have substantially higher market power, but the results in Table 5 indicate that these hospitals do have a relatively large bargaining power advantage. These findings suggest the need for further research to better identify the mechanisms by which physician arrangements affect a hospital's bargaining power, particularly given the recent emphasis by policy makers on strengthening the vertical relationship between physicians and hospitals.
Teaching hospitals are associated with significantly higher bargaining power for the system members in the same market as the teaching hospital. As the demand estimates show, teaching hospitals are particularly attractive to patients indicating that they will have significant market power. Having controlled for the market power of teaching hospitals, however, these results indicate that teaching status is also associated with substantial bargaining power. 56 Conversely, rural status is associated with substantially weaker bargaining power.
To test whether or not larger hospitals have more bargaining power we include the number of beds and the number of beds squared. The results have mixed signs and are generally not statistically different from zero. 57 This does not mean that larger hospitals are not able to exercise market power to extract relatively more profit, though. Given the concavity in the incremental value of adding a hospital to an MCO's network with respect to number of beds, a larger hospital should generate proportionately more surplus and thus profit, than a smaller hospital (Horn and Wolinsky, 1988; Stole and Zwiebel, 1996; Chipty and Snyder, 1999; Inderst and Wey, 2003) . 58 However, if the ability of a larger hospital to secure a higher reimbursement rate is derived from convexities in the value of a hospital to an MCO then the market-power effect absorbs the differences between larger and smaller hospitals and there will be no difference in the bargaining power.
groups. 56 Note that the "Teaching Hospital" variable represents the proportion of the system hospitals in a local patient market that are teaching hospitals so that the value will be 1 for a singleton teaching hospital and 0.25 for a system consisting of four hospitals where 1 is a teaching hospital. The average value for "Teaching Hospital" for system-market observations where one of the hospitals is a teaching hospital is 0.577. 57 We also tried using dummies indicating if a hospital is in the 50-75th percentile, 75th to 90th percentile, and higher than the 90th percentile in number of beds and again found no evidence that larger hospitals have more bargaining power.
58 To see this, recall that the marginal value of adding a hospital to a network is given as ∆V = N ln 1/(1 − s) dF . Letting Y represent the number of patients who receive treatment at the added hospital, which is strongly correlated with hospital size, and X represent the number of other patients enrolled with the MCO, the marginal value can be rewritten as ∆V = N ln (X + Y )/X dF , which is concave in Y .
The hospitals' market share and squared market share within a 10 mile radius are also included as measures of the importance of the hospital to the local patient market. 59 As with hospital size, we find no significant relationship to bargaining power, suggesting that the higher reimbursement rates associated with market shares are purely a result of market power.
Lastly, several studies (e.g., Melnick and Keeler (2007); Ho (2009) ) find that system hospitals have higher reimbursement rates independent of the market power effect. We include a simple dummy indicating whether a hospital is in a system to compare with this literature on hospital prices and system membership. Our results also show that in addition to market power system membership is associated with higher bargaining power, though the magnitude is fairly small and none of the estimates are statistically significant. While system hospitals as a group do not appear to have substantially higher bargaining power, the large standard error on the estimated coefficient suggests significant variation in bargaining power across system hospitals that may potentially be related to certain system characteristics. We explore this possibility in the next section.
D. Hospital Systems and Bargaining Power
To identify characteristics of hospital systems that may be associated with bargaining power we estimate a number of alternative specifications which allow bargaining power to vary with system size and cross-market characteristics. Table 6 reports four of these specifications. All of the regressions are performed using cost specification (C5)-the most inclusive specification-and estimated assuming that a contract with an MCO represents 15% of the predicted managed care patients in the market. Each specification includes the regressors from the basic bargaining model reported in Table 5 . The estimates for IPA, GPWW and teaching status are consistent with the values reported in specification C5 in Table 6 showing that these types of vertical arrangements and teaching status are associated with substantially higher reimbursement rates than can be explained by the additional value placed on these characteristics by the MCO's enrollees.
The reported regression specifications vary only in the type of system controls we include. To make sure that the largest systems in our data are not driving the results we include indicators identifying if a system is a national system (B), one of the seven systems having 10 or more hospitals in the data accounting for 32% of the observations (C), 60 or if the system is a part of Tenet 59 We limited the market share to a 10 mile radius because, on average, 72% of a hospital's managed care population originate from within 10 miles of the hospital whereas only 18% originate from a distance of 10 to 20 miles, and only 8% from a distance of 20 to 40 miles. Therefore, if we extend the radius too far, then all hospitals will appear to have fairly low market shares and, if we crop the radius in too tight, then hospitals will appear to have very high market shares creating too little variation between hospitals.
60 The largest systems include Catholic Healthcare West (31 hospitals), Sutter Health (23 hospitals), Adventist Health (14 hospitals), Prime Healthcare Services (12 hospitals), TENET Healthcare Corporation (11 hospitals), Kindred Healthcare (10 hospitals), and St. Joseph Health System (10 hospitals). 197 197 197 197 Note: All regressions use 15% of predicted managed care patients for the change in cost calculation. All market shares represent the average market share of patients for the system in a 10 mile radius of each system member within that patient market. Not all regressors are reported. The estimates for γ Significance Levels: * * * p < .01, * * p < .05, * p < .1 or Catholic Healthcare West, the largest for-profit and not-for-profit systems in the data (D). 61
Including these variables had virtually no affect on the point estimates for the other parameters.
Furthermore, the system indicators have large standard errors suggesting significant variation in the bargaining power of the systems across patient markets.
To test whether or not larger systems, which may have more resources to develop better bargaining strategies, have more bargaining power we include the total number of hospitals in the system nationally. The estimates indicate that for every ten hospitals in the system it secures about 2 to 3% more of the surplus generated by the relationship. The average hospital system in the US includes 19 hospitals implying that the average system extracts an additional 5% of the surplus generated by the contract than non-system hospitals. For the largest systems such as Hospital Corporation of America, which had 166 hospitals nationally in 2008, this translates into a significant difference in bargaining power over a smaller system with otherwise similar characteristics. In addition to the number of hospitals in the system nationwide we also include a measure of the number of distinct patient markets in which that system operates hospitals within California. The estimated coefficient is small and statistically insignificant. 62
It is also possible that systems may be able to leverage strength in one particular market to extract more rents in another. To test for this we allow bargaining power to differ based on the highest market share that the system holds in one of its patient markets within the state and find no significant relationship. Since systems with teaching hospitals have both higher market power and higher bargaining power in the local market, we also included an indicator variable identifying whether or not the system had a teaching hospital in a different patient market-denoted "Has Teaching Hospital" in Table 6 . We find very weak evidence that this is associated with bargaining power as the parameter estimates are all positive but not precisely estimated.
Our empirical findings reveal substantial variation in bargaining power across hospitals due to factors such as physician affiliations and teaching status. Moreover, we find that the size of the system has a strong association with bargaining power. This relationship is particularly important because many systems consist of dozens of hospitals with the largest having well over a hundred.
Furthermore, because system size is a characteristic that is independent of any individual patient market it is unlikely that the bargaining power differences actually represent some residual or unmeasured local market power differences not captured by the option demand framework. These results also indicate that measuring the price effects of a merger using techniques which focus only 61 Note that these are the largest systems measured by number of member hospitals in our data and not the largest nationally. Each system includes more than 20 percent of their respective type of system hospitals. 62 We do not observe the number of markets nationally in which a system has hospitals.
on market power in the local patient market will fail to capture other important factors that impact prices. In the next section we assess the potential impact that bargaining power differences can have on prices by examining and comparing the additional markups that arise as a result of market power and bargaining power for hospital systems in California.
VI. Market Power Versus Bargaining Power
Hospital systems generate market power by threatening to withdraw all system hospitals within the local patient market if there is disagreement over a favorable reimbursement rate. Consequently, system growth can increase market power only if it alters the structure of the local market. In contrast, growth of the system outside of a particular patient market can potentially impact prices in that market if it affects the system's bargaining power in that market. An important advantage of our empirical model is that it enables us to separately identify and study the impact of these two supply-side channels on the hospitals' reimbursement rates. To assess the relative impact of the market power and bargaining power effects we estimate the additional markups to the reimbursement rates that are attributable to a system's market power and bargaining power. The market power effect of the system represents the additional markup in the system's average daily reimbursement that is attributable to its ability to adjust the disagreement point by threatening to withdraw all system members. Similarly, the bargaining power effect of the system represents the additional markup in the system's average daily reimbursement that is attributable to the larger bargaining power parameter associated with system characteristics that would not be present if each member hospital had operated individually. 63
Estimates of the market power and bargaining power effects are computed for each hospital system in each patient market. Table 7 reports the 75th, 50th, and 25th percentiles as well as the average levels of these two effects for each regression specification reported in Table 6 . When there is just one system hospital in a particular patient market then there will not be a market power effect of being in a system for that hospital because the disagreement point still involves removing only one hospital from patients' choice sets. As a result, we provide statistics for all system-market pairs and for only system-market pairs which have multiple hospitals within the same patient market.
The findings reveal that differences in bargaining power tend to contribute substantially more than differences in market power to a system's markup. On average, differences in bargaining power are responsible for adding about $416 to the average per diem reimbursement whereas differences Note: The unit of observation is a System-market. Markups represent the increase in a hospital's average daily reimbursement rate that is attributable to system membership. The average for the hospital average daily reimbursement rate for manage care patients is $3,452. The increase from Market Power represents the part of the markup that is attributable to the system adjusting an MCO's threat-point by threatening to withdraw all of the system hospitals from the MCO's network. Statistics for Market Concentrated Systems are from those systems having more than one member hospital within the same patient market, thus can manipulate the threat-point by threatening to withdraw all hospitals. There are 58 observations in the data consisting of systems having more than one hospital in a local patient market and 60 observations of systems only having one hospital in a local patient market.
in market power add about $256 to the average per diem reimbursement for those hospitals having other local system partners. Including those system hospitals which do not have a local system partner dilutes the mean increase in markup resulting from market power to $73. There is also substantial variation in the markups generated by system hospitals. For example, there is a $600 to $700 difference in the additional markup stemming from bargaining power for a hospital in the 75th percentile in comparison to a hospital in the 25th percentile. Nevertheless, differences in bargaining power across hospitals are clearly the strongest contributor to observed differences in reimbursement rates. These results provide clear evidence that failing to account for bargaining power differences when analyzing the likely impact of a merger or system acquisition is likely to result in misleading predictions.
VII. Conclusions
Our findings highlight an important, yet overlooked, channel through which hospital mergers may lead to higher reimbursement rates. While previous studies have shown that merging hospitals can increase their value to MCOs by reducing competition in the local market, our results suggest that mergers may also increase hospitals' bargaining power, allowing them to extract a larger proportion of their value from MCOs. After controlling for the differences in value to MCOs as well as the costs to treat patients we find that system hospitals do extract a larger proportion of their value to MCOs than similar non-system hospitals. Indeed, we find that on average differences in bargaining power contribute more to the observed price differential between system and non-system hospitals than differences in hospital market power.
We also identify a number of hospital and system characteristics that are associated with bargaining power. For example, in addition to being more desirable to consumers (and therefore having greater market power) teaching hospitals also have significantly higher bargaining power. Hospitals affiliated with physicians groups also appear to have higher bargaining power. Interestingly, hospitals and systems with greater local market share do not appear to have higher bargaining power.
While a larger local market share creates market power by increasing the value of these hospitals to MCOs, they do not appear to be able to extract a more of the surplus they generate. Perhaps the most significant finding is that there is a strong association between the bargaining power of a hospital system in a particular patient market and the size of the system outside of that local market, even after controlling for the local market share of the system. This suggest that hospitals belonging to larger systems may be able to leverage their affiliation to extract more of the surplus beyond what can be done through local market power.
The importance of the effect of bargaining power and its association with hospital systems raises some important policy questions. Antitrust authorities have largely adopted the option demand approach developed by Town and Vistnes (2001) and Capps et al. (2003) for defining hospital markets and studying competition. 64 This methodology focuses entirely on identifying the local market power effect without considering the bargaining power effects we have identified.
As a consequence, recent antitrust analysis has concentrated on measuring how hospital mergers impact local market structure while ignoring how system affiliations outside the local market may impact prices. For example, an acquisition of a single hospital by a large national chain may not increase concentration in the local market, but could increase prices if that hospital now has greater bargaining power due to its affiliation with the national system. Merger simulations based on the option demand approach will not reflect this possible price effect.
It should be noted that while our structural model relies on economic theory to identify the bargaining power of individual hospitals, the theoretical literature provides very little guidance in understanding why differences in bargaining power arise. Consequently, our analysis is only able to 64 See Dranove and Sfekas (2009) for an overview of how these methods have been used in antitrust cases.
identify correlations between bargaining power and hospital characteristics (such as system membership). Our findings, however, mirror several basic predictions from the theoretical bargaining literature. For example, if system hospitals have access to better skilled or informed negotiating teams, then they would be expected to exhibit more bargaining power compared to non-system hospitals. Additionally, system hospitals would be predicted to have a bargaining advantage when negotiating with a risk averse MCO if they can more credibly signal a willingness to walk away from negotiations or threaten to exclude all system members from the MCO's network. This latter argument in particular is consistent with concerns commonly expressed in the industry that hospital systems leverage their size, both within and across markets, by threatening significant disruption to a large number of the MCO's patients (through a withdrawal from the MCO's network). Nevertheless, future theoretical or empirical analysis of the mechanisms through which hospital systems or vertical integration may impact bargaining power is likely to be particularly valuable.
Online Appendix: Not for Publication
This Online Appendix includes extra data tables to fill in some information that is not essential to the exposition, but that a reader may be interested in knowing. Table A1 reports the hospital services included in the demand specification as well as the MDC with which the service is interacted. Descriptive statistics for the included discharges are reported in Table A2 . The characteristics of the discharges are divided into five categories. The category "Insurer" indicates if the discharge is for a privately insured patient or a Medicare patient. The category "Type" indicates if the patient's insurance represents managed care or fee-for-service. The category "Choice Sets" reports statistics on the patients' hospital choice sets. The category "Diagnosis" has only one item, the patient's length of stay, which is a measure of the severity of a patient's illness. The category "Diagnostic Category" provides the shares for each of the 15 included MDCs. The final category "Patient" identifies the patients' characteristics and includes the patients' gender, age, race, number of hospitals in the patients' choice sets, travel time to the chosen hospital, the travel time to the other hospitals in the patient's choice set, 65 whether or not the patient comes from a rural location, and the average income for the patient's zip code. Table A3 reports the market shares for the top ten managed care companies in California.
A1. Summary Statistics
65 Travel time is calculated using the Google Maps API and is calculated as the travel time from the patient's home zip code centroid to the hospital taking into account traffic patterns, speed limits, and stop lights. For a couple rural zip codes there is no travel route from the zip code centroid because it is a desert or national or state park. In these cases the center of the nearest small town within the zip code is used and in all cases there is only one such town. A-2 Note: Kaiser Permanente is omitted because it is an integrated manage care network and is excluded from our data.
A-1
A2. Cost Estimates
Most coefficient estimates for the five cost specifications are reported in Table A4 . 66 The average cost of an in-patient day is 9.76% higher at a not-for-profit hospital than at a for-profit hospital. This suggests that either for-profit hospitals are more efficient or admit lower risk patients on average. However, the average cost of an in-patient day only highlights part of the difference in costs. To see how else the two types of hospital differ we used the estimated cost functions to calculate the difference in total costs at the sample means. Table A6 reports these cost differences. Each row represents the cost differential based on applying the sample means to the estimated cost functions. The column 1 reports the overall difference in cost for a not-for-profit and forprofit hospital, column 2 reports the difference in costs that is attributable to the difference in characteristics of the hospitals (e.g., the differences in patient volumes, nurse-to-bed ratios, etc.), and column 3 reports the difference in costs attributable to the difference in the parameter estimates (i.e., the difference in the hospital's technologies or cost functions). The results show that not-forprofit hospitals have substantially higher costs than for-profits with an overall difference ranging from 253% in cost specification (C5) to 321% in cost specification (C2). The differential in costs is largely driven by a significantly larger patient volume at not-for-profit hospitals. For instance, the average number of out-patient visits at a not-for-profit hospital is 166,310 compared to 48,508 at a for-profit, and the average number of discharges are 11,525 at a not-for-profit, compared to 7,582 at a for-profit hospital. 67 We also find that the average cost of an in-patient day is 8.5% higher at a system hospital than at a non-system hospital. As with not-for-profit hospitals, this may indicate that system hospitals are less efficient, or that system hospitals have a more severe patient case mix. We find that there is no statistically significant difference between the propensity of a for-profit compared to not-for-profit hospital to be in a system with for-profit hospitals representing about 25 percent of the system hospitals in the sample. We also applied the sample means for the two types of hospitals to the estimated cost functions and the cost differences are reported in Table A7 . Though not as dramatic of a difference as found with for-profit and not-for-profit hospitals, on average system hospitals have higher overall costs ranging from 27% in cost specification (C5) to 41% in cost specification (C2). Only about 10 to 20 percent of the cost difference is due to a difference in 66 Complete estimates are available on request. 67 Both patient-volume differences are statistically different at the p = .01 level.
A-3 the hospitals' technologies. Results continued on next page.
Note: LOS is the total number in-patient days for either Medicare or the privately insured. Omitted coefficients include estimates for all other in-patient days and government interactions with outputs. All outputs are in logs as well as the number of staff, the number of beds, and the dollar amount of fixed assets. Errors are clustered by hospital. All specifications include time and HSA fixed effects and have an adjusted R 2 greater than 0.97. Significance Levels: * * * p < .01, * * p < .05, * p < .1 Table A8 reports the bargaining power estimates re-estimated under the assumption that the representative MCOs market share is 50%, 25%, 15%, 10%, and 1%. These different proportions of managed care patients are used to estimate the hospitals' change in costs and revenues, and the MCOs' change in expenditures when a hospital is not in its network. All of the regressions utilize cost specification (C5) as the hospitals' cost function. The middle group (15%) corresponds with the results in column (C5) reported in Table 5 .
A3. Bargaining Power Estimates
There are no notable deviations in the estimates in for the 50%, 25%, or 10% groups from the 15% group used in the main analysis. The fact that there is not much variation between estimates based upon the proportion of predicted managed care patients is reassuring in that the results are not sensitive to the proportion of patients used for a representative MCO. At the extreme of 1% we do observe some deviations in the estimates, particularly with some of the standard errors, but the A-4 Note: LOS is the total number in-patient days for either Medicare or the privately insured. Omitted coefficients include estimates for all other in-patient days and government interactions with outputs. All outputs are in logs as well as the number of staff, the number of beds, and the dollar amount of fixed assets. Errors are clustered by hospital. All specifications include time and HSA fixed effects and have an adjusted R 2 greater than 0.97. Significance Levels: * * * p < .01, * * p < .05, * p < .1 general relationships between the parameter estimates as well as the point estimates are consistent. Nevertheless, given the few large market share MCOs operating in California the 1% sample is inappropriate for the analysis.
A-5 Total Difference = lnĈ N P − lnĈ Predictions are evaluated at the sample means for not-for-profit hospitals, X SY S , and for-profit hospitals X N . Theβ i are the coefficient estimates reported in Table A5 . Difference due to parameters = X
SY S iβ i
Predictions are evaluated at the sample means for system hospitals, X SY S , and nonsystem hospitals X N . Theβ i are the coefficient estimates reported in Table A5 .
A-6 197 197 197 197 197 Note: All regressions utilize cost specification C5. All market shares represent the average market share of patients for the system in a 10 mile radius of each system member within that patient market. Errors are clustered by hospital and adjusted to account for data generated by first-stage regressions. Significance Levels:*** p < .01, ** p< .05, * p < .1
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